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ABSTRACT 
In this paper we present an attack, which allows fraudulent 
transactions to be collected from EMV contactless credit and debit 
cards without the knowledge of the cardholder. The attack 
exploits a previously unreported vulnerability in EMV protocol, 
which allows EMV contactless cards to approve unlimited value 
transactions without the cardholder’s PIN when the transaction is 
carried out in a foreign currency. For example, we have found that 
Visa credit cards will approve foreign currency transactions for 
any amount up to €999,999.99 without the cardholder’s PIN, this 
side-steps the £20 contactless transaction limit in the UK. This 
paper outlines our analysis methodology that identified the flaw in 
the EMV protocol, and presents a scenario in which fraudulent 
transaction details are transmitted over the Internet to a “rogue 
merchant” who then uses the transaction data to take money from 
the victim’s account. In reality, the criminals would choose a 
value between €100 and €200, which is low enough to be within 
the victim’s balance and not to raise suspicion, but high enough to 
make each attack worthwhile. The attack is novel in that it could 
be operated on a large scale with multiple attackers collecting 
fraudulent transactions for a central rogue merchant which can be 
located anywhere in the world where EMV payments are 
accepted.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.4.4 [Computers and Society]: Electronic Commerce – 
Cybercash, digital cash, Payment Schemes, Security; 
C.3 [Special-Purpose and Application-Based Systems]: – 
Smartcards 
General Terms 
Security 
Keywords 
Contactless cards, EMV, fraudulent transaction, foreign currency 
transaction limits, rogue merchant. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Our research has identified a practical attack on EMV1 contactless 
credit and debit cards, which allows large-scale “harvesting” of 
fraudulent payments from unsuspecting cardholders. The attack 
exploits six functional characteristics of EMV contactless credit 
and debit cards: 
                                                                
1 EMV (Europay, MasterCard, and Visa) is a global standard to support 
interoperable card payment system between Visa, MasterCard, 
American Express and JCB.  
 Many Visa2 credit cards will approve unlimited value 
transactions in a foreign currency; this allows the attack to 
maximise the money extracted from each credit / debit card. 
 The contactless interface allows transactions to be extracted 
whilst the card is still in the cardholder’s wallet. 
 The cardholder’s PIN is not required for contactless 
transactions; this allows the fraudulent transaction to be 
extracted from the card without any further interaction from 
the cardholder. 
 Visa contactless cards will approve transactions in offline 
mode; this allows the attack to be performed without 
connecting to the card payment system, thereby avoiding any 
additional security checks by the bank. 
 The merchant details are not included in the data 
cryptographically protected by the card; this allows the 
merchant details to be added later, making the attack more 
flexible and scalable. 
 While the EMV protocol requires payment cards to 
authenticate themselves to the Point of Sale (POS) terminals, 
currently there is no requirement for POS terminals to 
authenticate themselves. 
The main contribution of this paper is the identification of a newly 
discovered vulnerability of the EMV protocol centred on the 
card’s handling of foreign currencies.  This is made possible by a 
combination of the six functional characteristics described above.  
The introduction of EMV contactless cards has created a situation 
comparable to that described by Reason in his “Swiss cheese” 
model [10] where layers of protection can be compromised if 
holes on each layer line up to create an exploitable attack.  In this 
case, the six characteristics line up in a way that defeats the 
safeguards put in place by EMV.  Through this paper we also 
contribute two potential solutions which will block this 
vulnerability. 
The ability to capture fraudulent transactions and store them for 
later transmission to a rogue merchant makes this attack different 
from previously described relay attacks [3][6] on EMV 
contactless cards.  The relay attack depends upon very close 
synchronisation between two attackers; the first attacker has to be 
in contact with the victim’s card whilst the second attacker makes 
a purchase at a POS terminal.  This makes relay attacks difficult 
to operate on a large scale. 
                                                                
2 The attack presented in this paper has only been observed on contactless 
Visa cards. However our testing has showed that the underlying flaw 
also exists in MasterCard, but additional security measures implemented 
by MasterCard have prevented the manifestation of this attack. 
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Similar to the “Chip & PIN is broken” attack [9], our attack can 
potentially be operated on a large scale. “Chip & PIN is broken” 
allows attackers to buy goods from retailers, whereas the attack 
described in this paper is different in that it targets the money in 
the victim’s bank account. 
The very recent “Chip and Skim” attack [1] is similar to our attack 
in that it could be operated on a large scale and it extracts money 
from the victim’s account.  It would be interesting to explore the 
possibility of using our mobile phone contactless-transaction-
collecting app as the “skimming” platform for the Chip and Skim 
attack. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents 
our methodology for finding the vulnerabilities, including the 
outline of the process, and the resulting formal abstract model, 
from which we derive our attack. Section 3 provides an overview 
of the attack, which is composed of two stages: collection of 
fraudulent transactions, and converting these transactions into 
money. Section 4 outlines existing safeguard to protect EMV 
transactions, while Section 5 looks into the EMV functionality 
exploited by the attack. Section 6 outlines the experimental 
software implementation to carry out the attack, including an 
Android app and a rogue merchant server. Section 7 presents 
some results from executing the attack, demonstrating the 
feasibility of such attack.  In Section 8 we offer potential methods 
for preventing the attack and Section 9 concludes our paper. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
Our work focuses on the analysis of the EMV payments protocol 
and specifically the security impact of the introduction of 
contactless and mobile payments functionality into the protocol. 
Analysis of the protocol is non-trivial due to the complexity of the 
EMV payment protocol specification.  EMV is a global payment 
system, the protocol therefore has to incorporate competing (and 
sometimes conflicting) requirements from each of the credit card 
issuers (MasterCard, Visa, Amex, JCB, Diners, Discover, 
UnionPay) and from the financial regulators in each of the 
countries in which EMV operates. In addition, the introduction of 
contactless / mobile payments has significantly increased the 
complexity of the EMV specifications.  The EMV specification 
for contact (Chip & PIN) credit / debit cards describes a single 
unified payment protocol sequence (kernel) for all card types.  
The specification for contactless / mobile payments contains 
seven protocol sequences (kernels), one for each card issuer.  The 
complexity and page count has expanded, from four books 
comprising 765 pages for contact transactions, to fourteen books 
containing 2,392 pages for both contact and contactless. 
To address this complexity, we have developed a systematic 
approach which combines formal and informal techniques.  At the 
centre of our approach are UML sequence diagrams, an example 
of which can be seen in Figure 6, which we use as the informal 
but precise description of the protocol fragments.  Each UML 
diagram is accompanied by a table listing the references in the 
EMV specification which were the diagram's information source. 
Creating the UML diagrams takes input from three main sources: 
(i) the EMV specification documents, (ii) feedback from insights 
gained by the developers coding the emulator, and (iii) feedback 
from insights gained by the designers constructing a formal 
model.  Essential to our process is the systematic line-by-line 
documentation of the linkage between EMV specification, UML 
diagram, abstract formal model, emulator code and test cases. 
The formal aspects of our approach are inspired by the Praxis 
methodology [2], tailored to our needs. It focuses on the 
construction and proof of an abstract model using the Z notation 
[13].  This abstract model is used to investigate the consistency of 
the requirements, expose descriptive errors, and ultimately be 
used to generate test cases for the emulator code.  Ultimately, if 
our abstract formal model correctly characterises the EMV 
requirements, then our test cases will be both minimal and wide-
reaching, given they come from the mathematical characterisation 
of the EMV requirements for NFC. 
2.1 The Process 
Figure 1 shows our analysis process. The rounded boxes are 
activity nodes within the process e.g. [A1].  The square boxes are 
object nodes e.g. [O1.0]: these are the data sources that drive the 
activities.  Connecting edges, represented as black solid-arrows, 
indicate the default order in the flow of activities.  The red 
dashed-arrows are connecting edges, which indicate feedback, 
creating an iterative process of refinement of the UML diagrams 
[O1.1], the abstract model [O2.1] and the emulator code [O4.1]. 
EMV 
Specifications
[O0.0]
Develop Transaction 
Sequence Diagrams
[A1]
Develop Transaction 
Emulation Code
[A4]
Develop Abstract 
Model
[A2]
UML Transaction 
Sequence Diagrams 
with EMV References
[O1.1]
Abstract Model
[O2.1]
Develop Test Cases
[A3]
Test Cases
[O3.1]
Emulator Code
[O4.1]
Card Capabilities
[O5.0]
Run Test Cases
[A5]
Test Results / 
Findings
[O5.1]
List of Anomalies
[O2.2]
Feedback
Feedback
Feedback
Feedback
 
Figure 1. Protocol analysis process 
At the centre of our approach is the construction [A1] of UML 
sequence diagrams [O1.1] with accompanying reference lists.  
Much of the process is about constructing these sequence 
diagrams as accurately as possible.  To achieve this, we use a 
detailed analysis of the EMV requirements and a detailed working 
knowledge of the structure of the various specifications 
contributing to a single transaction. Moreover, we use feedback 
from the formal model construction [A2], the derivation of test 
cases [A3] and the coding [A4].   
The EMV specifications [O0.0] are the originating source of all of 
the data in the process.  Any data or assumption made in the 
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emulator code or in the abstract model should be traceable back to 
its origin (i.e. the book/section/page within the EMV 
specifications).  The EMV specifications are structured so that the 
complete description for a single transaction protocol sequence is 
split across multiple sections and multiple books.  The UML 
sequence diagrams [O1.1] collate these multiple sources into a 
single easy to follow description of the transaction sequence.  
These transaction sequence diagrams are the initial stage of the 
iterative process that we used to create the concrete software 
implementation of the emulator [O4.1].   
At each stage of the process, if additional information is found 
about the working of EMV it is fed back into the UML transaction 
sequence diagrams [O1.1].  The feedback is essential to refine our 
understanding of the EMV specifications and document it.  Each 
time the diagrams are updated, this drives the improvement of the 
emulator code [O4.1].  The completed emulator code is used in 
practical experiments [A5], running full or partial transaction 
protocol sequences against real bank cards. 
2.2 UML Protocol Sequence Diagrams 
The role of the UML protocol sequence diagrams is to collate 
information from multiple sources in the EMV specification, 
creating a single description of the payment protocol sequence 
(kernel). 
There are eight payment protocol sequences (kernels) in the EMV 
specification, one for contact transactions and seven for 
contactless transactions. There is a single UML diagram for each 
of the eight kernels.  Each diagram is accompanied by a table of 
references detailing the EMV specification sections from which 
the diagram was derived.  Each reference details the EMV book, 
section number, page number and a section of text describing the 
functionality. 
Table 1. Snippet of UML diagram references table 
Descriptive Text References 
7.1 Transaction Setup Data 
including PDOL list 
If the Visa application is 
successfully selected the card will 
return the data that the terminal 
requires to set up the transaction 
including the PDOL list. The 
Processing Data Objects List 
(PDOL) is a list of data fields the 
card requires to complete the 
transaction, the terminal returns the 
populated PDOL data in the Get 
Processing Options command.  
Typically the data fields requested 
by the card will include the 
transaction amount, currency, date, 
country and POS terminal 
capabilities (TTQ). 
EMV v2.2 Book C-3 
2.4.1 Initiate Application 
Processing, page 12 
 
EMV v4.3 Book 3 
10.1 Initiate Application 
Processing, page 91 
 
EMV v2.2 Book B 
3.5 Outcome Processing 
(3.5.1.5 Other), page 33 
 
EMV v4.3 Book 4 
Annex A - Coding of 
Terminal Data Elements, 
page 115 
 
Table 1 shows a snippet of the references table for Figure 6, 
which provides the details of one of the 26 steps in the Visa fDDA 
[5] protocol sequence (kernel 3). 
It is these reference tables that provide the documented link 
between the UML diagrams and the EMV specification 
documents. 
2.3 Protocol Emulator 
The protocol emulator is a concrete software implementation of 
the EMV payments protocol.  It is both an end product of the 
analysis process and the test-bed used to validate the findings of 
our analysis process; for instance the protocol emulator was used 
to confirm the existence of the foreign currency flaw in UK issued 
credit / debit cards. 
To maintain the linkage between the protocol emulator code and 
the UML diagrams / EMV specification, we insert comments into 
the Java code.  These comments contain the same descriptive text 
and references as per Table 1.  In this way, each line of Java code 
can be traced back to its origin in the EMV specification and can 
also be understood as part of the overall protocol sequence thanks 
to the references to the UML diagrams. 
2.4 Formal Abstract Model 
In this work, we studied the EMV requirements documents [4][5] 
to produce a formal abstract model of its properties and 
functionalities, specifically for the Visa fDDA contactless 
transaction protocol (summarised in Figure 6). The motivation is 
to capture these requirements mathematically, enabling checking 
that the properties of interest hold (i.e. the requirements 
documents are consistent), and to produce test cases for our EMV 
emulator derived from formal proof of operational feasibility of 
each protocol stage (i.e. by proving the stage is feasible, we 
expose both abstract behaviours: normal and exceptional). 
2.4.1 Implementation of the Abstract Model 
Our abstract model uses the Z notation [13].  Proof obligations in 
Z are usually of three kinds: well-formedness of models, where 
partial functions are applied within their domains, and unique 
existential quantifiers are sound; operational feasibility, where 
specified operations have (implicitly defined) preconditions strong 
enough to establish (explicitly defined) post-conditions; and data 
reification via (usually forward) simulation, where the use of 
(concrete) data structure representations in operations closer to an 
implementation language are shown to respect the abstract 
representation and operations. 
Our models have 49 type definitions, 61 Z schemas representing 
the NFC operations of the protocol, and 79 proofs in total, of 
which 49 are theorems representing properties of interest for the 
whole model [7].  Feasibility proofs are useful in deducing formal 
model-based test cases, as they characterise the complete space of 
behaviours for all operations of interest, including successful and 
all possible error cases, both determined by mathematical 
predicates representing disjoint behaviours of the protocol.  That 
is, feasibility proofs characterise a set of disjoint predicates with 
(in EMV’s case) non-overlapping conditions that when 
accumulated lead to true (e.g. pre-condition of an operation being 
x < 0 or x > 0 or x = 0).  Thus, each disjunct represents a unique 
class of behaviours for the functionality being proved.  Moreover, 
we also prove that these disjunct predicates amount to true, hence 
we guarantee all behaviours are accounted for. 
The formal model follows the methodology advocated in [2], 
which enumerates requirements realised by each piece for formal 
specification. Thus, if all elements of the requirements are 
accounted for within the abstract mathematical model in a way 
that conveys the intended behaviour described in English, then 
proofs about the abstract model (or rather, proof failure) will lead 
(as our experiments show) into potential attacks and 
vulnerabilities discovered through proof investigation. Once 
validated by EMV experts, such formal model becomes a more 
4 
 
accurate representation of the EMV protocol than the EMV books 
[4][5]. 
These efforts correspond to the POS terminal side of Figure 6.  
The mechanisation of a formal concrete design, together with a 
proof of refinement indicate that these designs faithfully satisfy 
the abstract model linked to the requirements.  Refinement proofs 
are perhaps the most costly aspect of a proof exercise, as it needs 
to establish that the implementation details do not breach any of 
the contractual requirements established by the abstract model. 
This concrete model can then serve to annotate the Java (or any 
other implementation) with formal specification for code-level 
functional correctness as done by tools such as VeriFast [11].   
Furthermore, we derive a set of test cases from this abstract model 
that is the smallest with highest coverage possible.  We also 
derive a systematic code-annotation technique, using the same 
principle to enumerate what aspect of the requirements each piece 
of code within the emulator is realised.  These test cases represent 
a test-oracle based on requirements testing, rather than testing for 
any implementation issues.  Together, the test cases and 
systematic code annotation are useful for capturing potential 
(major) errors.  Errors from the concrete design are more likely to 
expose problems with implementation choices, and it is our aim in 
the future to annotate the emulator code with formal specification 
amenable to static analysis of the properties corresponding to the 
behaviour of the code. 
2.4.2 Abstract Model for Foreign Currency 
Transaction Limits 
EMV specifies the transaction currency as one of the data fields 
for mandatory inclusion in the Application Cryptogram (AC) [4].  
This indicates the importance of the currency as it is one of the 
fields which is cryptographically protected against alteration. 
Nevertheless, the EMV books do not specify the process required 
when the terminal and the card have different currencies.  This 
omission was discovered as part of the process to formulate the 
pre-conditions for the abstract model that currency exchanges 
were consistent.  It was clear that the currency was one of the pre-
conditions that should be included in the model, but we could not 
establish the correct process or outcome when the terminal 
currency was different from the card’s currency. 
The abstract model has identified the following pre-conditions 
relating to currency: (i) the native currency of the card; (ii) the 
native currency of the POS terminal; and (iii) the currency of the 
current transaction. For instance, when assembling the fDDA 
Processing Data Objects List (PDOL) for a Visa NFC transaction 
we get the following Z schema (from [7]):  
 
It creates the NFCVisaPDOL! with the adequate fields from both 
the card’s and transaction’s data. The PDOL amount, however, 
needs to be corrected for the card’s target/preferred currency. For 
that we use a bijective function linking currencies and countries, 
as well as the agreed transaction currency (returned as 
tcurrency!), and the given cardCurrency? input for the 
given amount.  This PDOL is then used to produce the AC and the 
Signed Dynamic Authentication Data (SDAD) for the validation 
of the transaction, by the bank and the POS terminal respectively. 
We could satisfy all requirements when cardCurrency? is 
equal to tCurrency!; however we could not do the same when 
they are not equal. This prompted us to run foreign currency 
transaction experiments on real credit cards using the emulator, 
revealing the vulnerabilities leading to the attack. 
3. OVERVIEW OF THE ATTACK 
Figure 2 shows the key elements of the attack and how they 
interact with the EMV payment system.  
 
Figure 2. Transaction harvesting attack 
The attack consists of two stages: 
 Attackers (collection of fraudulent transactions): attackers 
using Near Field Communication (NFC) enabled Android 
mobile phones can collect fraudulent transactions from 
unsuspecting cardholders. This can be done whilst the 
contactless card is still in the cardholder’s pocket (see steps 1 
to 3 of Figure 2). 
 Rogue merchant (converting transactions into money): a 
rogue merchant converts the collected transactions into 
money in their bank account by sending the transaction data 
to a bank (steps 4 to 5 of Figure 2). 
Finally the transaction request enters the Card payment clearing 
system where the rogue merchant’s bank acts innocently to 
transfer the transactions into the card payment system, which 
transfers the money from the victim’s bank account into the rogue 
merchant’s bank account (see steps 6 to 10 of Figure 2). 
3.1 Collecting fraudulent transactions 
Transactions are collected using a malicious app written for NFC-
enabled Android mobile phones.  The app automatically initiates 
and collects a transaction immediately upon detection of a 
contactless credit / debit card in the phone’s NFC field. This 
process takes less than 500 milliseconds from card detection to 
transaction completion. 
It is imagined that attackers will operate in a similar way to 
pickpockets, hiding their activity in crowded situations such as on 
public transport or in the crowd at an event.  When a credit / debit 
card is detected, the app gives the attacker an audible signal 
through their headphones; a second audible signal is given when 
the transaction collection is complete.  This will allow the attacker 
to operate without attracting too much attention. 
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3.1.1 Hardware 
An Android mobile phone is chosen as the attack platform for the 
following reasons: 
 Android mobile phones have a built-in NFC reader. 
 An Android phone is an innocuous item for the attacker to 
carry in a crowded place; for example, it will not raise 
attention if the attacker is stopped by the police, since 
everyone carries mobile phones these days. 
 The mobile phone platform provides portability, Internet 
connectivity and good battery life, making it a very capable 
attack platform. 
3.1.2 The transaction collecting app 
The attack starts when the NFC-enabled Android phone identifies 
a contactless credit / debit card which is vulnerable to this attack 
in the victim’s wallet.  The app sends a transaction request to the 
vulnerable card. 
The app plays an audible alert to the attacker to signal that a 
vulnerable card has been found. 
When the victim’s card receives the transaction request message, 
it can approve or decline the transaction. If the card approves the 
transaction it generates the AC and the SDAD, this proves to the 
bank and POS terminal respectively that the card that approved 
the transaction was genuine (see Section 4.3 for more detail). 
The cryptographic algorithms used to generate the AC and SDAD 
also ensure that the transaction details cannot be changed 
subsequent to the card authorising the transaction. 
When the attack is complete the app plays a second audible alert. 
3.1.3 Storage of approved transactions 
The app was designed to operate in locations where an Internet 
connection is not always available, for example on underground 
public transport. Therefore the app will initially just store the 
transaction authorisation data returned by the victim’s card.  
When a reliable Internet connection is available, the app will send 
the stored transaction data to the rogue merchant who will convert 
the transaction data into money. 
The ability to capture fraudulent transactions offline and store 
them for later transmission is one of the novel features of this 
attack. This allows the attack to be operated on a large scale 
without the need for synchronisation. 
Furthermore, storing the transactions minimises the time required 
to collect fraudulent transactions as the app does not have to wait 
for a connection.  It also allows the attackers to operate in victim-
rich crowded places that are normally without an Internet 
connection such as on subway trains, on buses and at large events. 
3.2 Converting transaction data into money 
The criminals would set up a rogue merchant account with an 
acquirer bank in one of the 76 countries that accept EMV 
payments.  This rogue merchant will receive the fraudulent 
transactions collected by the attackers and convert them into 
money by sending the transaction data to the bank. 
The rogue merchant consists of three elements: 
 An Internet-based listening service, which will receive 
collected transaction data from attackers. 
 A data format conversion process, which converts the 
fraudulent transactions collected by the attackers into the 
format required by the bank. 
 A rogue Point of Sale (POS) terminal, which must imitate the 
actions of a legitimate POS terminal so that it does not raise 
the bank’s suspicion.  To achieve this, the rogue POS takes 
the previously converted data, adds the merchant data and 
sends that data to the bank using an Internet Protocol (IP) 
connection. 
3.2.1 Internet-based listening service 
The rogue merchant provides an Internet-based listening service 
on a pre-arranged IP address and port number, to receive the 
fraudulent transactions from the attackers.  The transactions are 
initially stored to be processed later, once the merchant details 
have been added to the transaction and the connection to the 
acquirer bank is available. 
3.2.2 Data format conversion process 
Financial presentment request messages are used to transmit EMV 
credit / debit card transactions between the merchant (who 
captured the transaction) and the acquirer bank (who will process 
the transaction). 
Merchant-related data such as merchant ID, terminal ID and the 
merchant’s bank account details are added to the transaction to 
complete the data required by the EMV card clearing system.  The 
fraudulent transaction is now ready for transmission to the 
acquirer bank. 
The exact format of the message will differ slightly between 
different acquirer banks.  However, there are a number of 
mandatory fields that are the same for every acquirer bank.  
Standard 70 [12] in the UK and ISO 8583 [8] in other EMV 
countries define the mandatory data fields which must appear in 
the financial presentment request message and the optional fields 
which may differ between the acquirer banks. 
The software for our attack prototype implements a Standard 70 
message format, complete with all of the mandatory fields and a 
number of optional fields (see Section 6). 
3.2.3 Rogue POS terminal process 
Once correctly formatted, the financial presentment request 
message is sent to the bank.  The acquirer bank returns a financial 
presentment response message, to which the merchant responds 
with a financial presentment confirmation message that 
acknowledges receipt of the acquirer’s response message. 
The supported communication options for this message exchange 
are PSTN, X25 over ISDN, IP over ISDN, and IP over public 
networks (i.e. the Internet) for transmission of messages between 
the merchant and the acquirer bank.  The software implementation 
presented in this paper uses IP over the Internet. 
Our software implements data format conversion (Section 3.2.2) 
and implements the sending of the financial presentment request 
message over an IP connection protected by SSL/TLS encryption.   
For obvious reasons we were not willing or able to check against a 
real bank. Of course, one approach to defeating the attack is to try 
to detect rogue POS behaviour at the bank, but it is not clear how 
well this can be done. A simple solution would be to have the 
payment card reject any contactless foreign currency transaction 
immediately, but is just not practical. As we will argue in Section 
8, a more effective solution can be implemented by either forcing 
6 
 
foreign currency contactless transactions to be carried out in 
online mode only, or where that is not possible, to switch the 
transaction to "Chip & PIN". 
4. EMV TRANSACTION SAFEGUARDS 
In the UK, EMV credit / debit cards can perform two different 
transaction types: contactless “tap and go” transactions, and 
contact “Chip & PIN” transactions. 
4.1 Contactless “tap and go” transactions 
Contactless transactions are intended to be a quick and convenient 
replacement for small cash purchases.  In a contactless payment, 
the credit / debit card is placed on the POS terminal’s contactless 
reader for less than 1 second and the payment is approved. 
There are two significant differences between a contactless 
transaction and a contact “Chip & PIN” transaction.  First, the 
contact transaction requires the cardholder to enter their PIN, 
whereas the PIN is not required for contactless transactions. 
Second, contact transactions require the card to be removed from 
the wallet and inserted into the POS terminal, whilst contactless 
transactions is completed wirelessly by placing the card on the 
POS terminal, this can be done whilst the card is still in the wallet. 
PIN entry provides one of the key safeguards in “Chip & PIN” 
transactions. The PIN ensures that only the cardholder, who 
knows the PIN, can use the card. Contactless transactions are not 
protected by PIN entry.  EMV have therefore implemented the 
following safeguards to limit the potential loss from lost or stolen 
contactless cards: 
 In the UK, each contactless transaction is limited to £20; any 
transaction above this value will require a Chip & PIN 
transaction. 
 EMV cards are limited to five consecutive contactless 
transactions, after which the PIN must be entered in a “Chip 
& PIN” transaction. 
These safeguards ensure that the maximum loss due to a lost or 
stolen contactless card is £100. 
4.2 Contact “Chip & PIN” transactions 
The majority of EMV card transactions are “Chip & PIN” 
transactions.  “Chip & PIN” transactions allow purchases up to 
the balance of a debit card or the credit limit of a credit card. 
“Chip & PIN” transactions are protected by the following 
safeguards.  First, the cardholder must enter their PIN to authorise 
the transaction.  This is used to ensure that the person making the 
payment is the authorised cardholder. 
Second, if the value of the transaction is greater than the card’s 
offline transaction limit, the card will request that the POS 
terminal makes an online connection to the bank to perform 
additional authorisation checks.  The POS terminal must connect 
to the bank to provide the card with the online authorisation code 
(Authorisation Response Cryptogram (ARPC)).  The bank will 
respond with the authorisation code only if the card has not been 
reported lost or stolen, and the account has sufficient funds to pay 
for the transaction.  The card will only authorise the transaction if 
it receives a valid online authorisation code from the POS 
terminal. 
4.3 Cryptographic protection of transactions 
The EMV payment system utilises cryptography to ensure that (i) 
only genuine EMV credit / debit cards can authorise transactions 
(ii) the transaction details approved by the card cannot be altered. 
4.3.1 Application Cryptogram (AC) 
The AC contains a Message Authentication Code (MAC).  The 
MAC utilises a symmetric algorithm, either Triple DES or AES, 
to encipher the transaction data fields detailed below: 
 amount authorised (value of the purchase) 
 amount other (cashback amount if required) 
 terminal country code (UK - 0826, USA - 0840 etc.) 
 terminal verification results (POS status code) 
 transaction currency code (UK£ - 0826, US$ - 0840 etc.) 
 transaction date 
 transaction type (purchase - 00, cash - 01, refund - 20) 
 POS terminal unpredictable number (prevents cloned cards) 
 application interchange profile (card’s security capabilities) 
 application transaction counter (card’s transaction counter) 
The AC is sent to the bank as part of the Financial Presentment 
message (see Table 2).  This allows the bank to verify that the 
transaction details supplied by the merchant are the same as the 
transaction approved by the EMV card. 
4.3.2 Signed Dynamic Authentication Data (SDAD) 
The SDAD is a RSA digital signature on a SHA1 hash of the 
transaction data. In the Visa fDDA protocol the transaction data 
included in the SDAD are: 
 POS terminal unpredictable number  
 amount authorised  
 transaction currency code 
 card unpredictable number 
 card transaction qualifiers  
The SDAD is used by the POS terminal to verify that the card is 
genuine in an offline transaction. 
5. EMV FUNCTIONALITY EXPLOITED 
BY THE ATTACK  
The attack circumvents the safeguards built into EMV credit / 
debit cards by exploiting some EMV functionality that has been 
made vulnerable due to the introduction of contactless payment 
interface. In particular, there are three features that are exploited 
in our attack scenario: 
 Contactless foreign currency transactions. As described in 
Section 4.1, the safeguards built into EMV will limit the 
maximum value allowed for each contactless transaction to 
£20.  Any amount over £20 will require the cardholder to 
enter their PIN, and any amount above the offline transaction 
limit (e.g. £100) will require the POS terminal to connect to 
the bank to perform additional checks before the transaction 
is approved. Our research has found that EMV credit and 
debit cards can be tricked into approving contactless 
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transactions of much higher value than £20, simply by 
requesting the transaction in a foreign currency.  In our 
experiments, EMV cards have been found to approve 
contactless transactions up to €999,999.99 without requesting 
the PIN, and without requesting that the POS terminal goes 
online to perform additional checks.  This sidesteps the usual 
safeguards employed by EMV payments system. 
 Wireless interaction with card. This attack exploits the 
wireless interface on contactless cards to collect transaction 
authorisations whilst the card remains in cardholder’s wallet.  
This means the cardholder remains unaware that they have 
been exploited until their card statement arrives, thereby 
allowing the attack to operate for longer and be more 
lucrative to the attackers. 
 The merchant ID and terminal ID can be added later by the 
rogue merchant, as these data are not included in the AC 
generated by the card. The AC cryptographically ensures that 
the transaction data approved by the card is the same as that 
received by the issuing bank (see Section 4.3). 
6. IMPLEMENTATION 
To validate our research, we have implemented a number of 
software elements which demonstrate the viability and practicality 
of the attack.  The software consists of three separate applications: 
 An Android mobile phone app which captures transactions 
from the cards.  Transactions are stored on the Android 
phone to be transmitted to the rogue merchant later. 
 A rogue merchant Internet listening service which waits to 
receive the captured transactions from attackers using the 
Android mobile phone app. 
 A rogue merchant bank communications module which 
packages the transactions into financial presentment request 
messages for transmission to the bank.  This module handles 
all of the communication with the bank, which involves 
sending the financial presentment request messages and 
receiving acknowledgement messages. 
6.1 Android transaction capture app 
We have implemented the attack platform on an NFC enabled 
Android mobile phone as this would be an innocuous device for 
an attacker to carry around in a crowd. 
6.1.1 Attack platform 
For implementation and testing, we selected the Google Nexus 5 
mobile phone.  Implementing on a mobile phone platform limits 
the effective range to approximately 1 cm.  However in testing the 
Nexus 5 was capable of extracting transactions from an EMV 
contactless card which was located in a leather wallet in the 
pocket of a pair of jeans worn by our “unsuspecting” test victim. 
6.1.2 Android app operation 
The attacker starts by pre-setting the amount and currency for all 
the transactions which will be captured from the victims cards. 
Figure 3 shows the attacker setting the amount to 999,999.00 and 
setting the currency to 0978 which is the code for Euros.  In 
testing we have also obtained transaction approvals in US Dollars 
for $999,999.99 (currency code 0840). 
The app is now ready and will automatically collect a transaction 
from every EMV contactless card that it detects, without any 
further interaction from the attacker.  This will minimise the 
chance of the attacker being detected, as they are not constantly 
interacting with their phone. 
 
Figure 3. Capture transaction settings 
 
Figure 4. Capturing the transaction    
In Figure 4 the screen on the left shows the app waiting to detect 
an EMV contactless card.  The screen on the right shows the 
€999,999.99 transaction being captured from the card. 
When the app detects an EMV contactless card, it sounds an 
audible alert in the attacker’s headphones; a second alert is given 
once the transaction has been successfully collected.  This takes 
less than 500 milliseconds.  Once the transaction has been 
captured the app stores the transaction data for transmission to the 
rogue merchant later.  As soon as the app has collected a 
transaction, it automatically returns to waiting to detect another 
EMV card; it is now ready to collect the next transaction. 
Figure 5 shows the data fields as captured by the app, this 
includes all of the data and cryptographic authorisation codes 
required by the bank to accept the transaction as genuine. 
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The mobile app stores transaction data until it has an Internet 
connection, at which point the app transmits the data to the rogue 
merchant. 
 
Figure 5. Captured transaction data 
6.1.3 Transaction protocol 
The code implements the Visa fDDA [5] contactless transaction 
protocol sequence (depicted as Figure 6) as this is an offline only 
contactless protocol.  This allows the attack to be performed in 
less than 500 milliseconds and avoids additional validation by the 
bank. 
Payment CardPOS Terminal
1.0 InitiateTransaction()
3.0 PresentCardToTerminal()
4.0 ListAvailableNFCApplications()
4.1 List of available applications
7.0 SelectApplication(AID)
7.1 Transaction setup data inc. PDOL list
4.2 Command Error
7.2 Command Error
9.0 GetProcessingOptions(PDOL data)
9.7 Transaction Approved - TC + SDAD + 
Application Cryptogram (AC) + AFL
9.8 Transaction Must Go Online -ARQC
9.10 Command Error
9.9 Transaction Declined - AAC
10.0 ReadAFLRecord(SFI, Record)
10.1 AFL record
[ for each AFL SFI / record ]
12.0 RemoveCard()
Loop
9.1 GenerateUPN()
9.2 GenerateSDAD()
9.3 GenerateAC()
9.4 UpdateTransactionCount()
9.5 DecrementNFCCount()
9.6 UpdateAvailableOffline()
11.0 ValidateTransaction()
8.0 PopulatePDOL()
2.0 WaitForCard()
5.0 ChooseAID()
6.0 SelectTheKernel(AID)
 
Figure 6. Visa fDDA transaction protocol sequence 
6.1.4 Storing the transaction data 
The transaction data is sent by the card in TAG / Length / Value 
(TLV) format. The Android application stores all of the data fields 
returned by the card for later transmission to the rogue merchant. 
6.1.5 Transmission to the rogue merchant 
Our software can collect and store multiple offline transactions, 
without a connection to the Internet.  The stored transactions can 
then be transmitted once a suitable connection is available.  The 
transaction details will include all of the data fields required by 
the bank.  The Application Cryptogram (AC) and the clear text 
equivalent fields listed in Section 4.3 are arguably the most 
important, as together they are used by the bank to verify and 
thereby approve the transaction. 
6.2 The rogue merchant application 
The rogue merchant application consists of three processes: 
 an Internet listening service to receive the transactions from 
the Android transaction capture app 
 a data conversion module which converts the EMV data in 
TLV format into the ISO 8583 / Standard 70 format required 
by the bank 
 a POS terminal emulation which sends the formatted data to 
the bank to collect the money from the fraudulent 
transactions 
6.2.1 Internet based listening service 
This is a simple Internet based service which listens to a pre-
agreed IP address and port number.  The Android transaction 
capture app (Section 6.1) connects to the pre-arranged IP address 
and port number to send all of the collected transactions to the 
rogue merchant.  The listening service stores the transactions for 
later processing. 
6.2.2 Data conversion process 
The data conversion process accepts TLV data as captured from 
the EMV credit / debit card and converts it into ISO8583 / 
Standard 70 format required by the bank. 
To request the money from the victim’s account, the rogue 
merchant must send a financial presentment message (in ISO8583 
or Standard 70 format) to the acquirer bank that holds their 
merchant account.  
Table 2 shows the data fields required by the ISO 8583 financial 
presentment message and shows how the rogue merchant will 
complete the data fields from the data generated by the EMV card 
during transaction approval. 
6.2.3 POS terminal emulation 
Once the financial presentment request message has been 
generated, it is sent to the acquirer bank to complete the 
transaction and transfer the money from the victim’s bank account 
into the rogue merchant’s account. 
In the UK, communications with the acquirer bank over a public 
IP network must be protected using Secure Sockets 
Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) or IPSec [12]. 
The use of standard encryption such as SSL/TLS and/or IPSec 
allows the rogue terminal to be implemented in Java on a PC 
platform; no specialist hardware is required. 
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Table 2. Financial presentment message data requirements 
Item Name Description and mapping to EMV card data 
1 bit map extended  List of fields included in the message 
2 primary account number  0x5A – 16-digit card account number 
3  processing code  Constant 00 for goods and purchases 
4  amount, transaction 0x9F02 – the transaction amount 
5  amount, reconciliation  Transaction amount 0x9F02 converted into the currency to be applied to the 
victim’s card, this value is calculated by the rogue POS terminal 
7  date and time, transmission  Date and time the rogue POS transmits the transaction to the bank 
9  conversion rate, reconciliation Conversion rate for the reconciliation amount, calculated by the rogue POS 
terminal 
10  conversion rate, cardholder billing  As above; this value is calculated by the rogue POS terminal 
11  systems trace audit number  Transaction sequence number generated by the rogue POS terminal 
14  date, expiration  0x5F24 – Expiry date of the card (YYMM) 
16  date, conversion  Date / time of the currency conversion (same as 7) 
19  country code, acquiring institution Country code of the rogue POS terminal (e.g. 0826 for UK, 0840 for USA, 0036 
for Australia) 
20 country code, primary account number 0x5F28 – Country code for the card i.e. 0826 – UK 
21  country code, forwarding institution 0x5F28 – Country code for the bank that issued the card i.e. 0826 – UK 
22  point of service entry mode Type of POS terminal, constant value “051” for Chip & PIN / EMV contactless 
terminals 
23  card sequence number  0x5F34 – Identifies subsidiary EMV cards issued on the same 16-digit account 
number 
25   point of service condition code  Constant “00” normal card presentment 
26   point of service PIN capture code  Constant “x8xx” indicates a POS terminal that accepts up to 8 digits 
27 approval code length  Constant set by acquirer bank 
32  acquiring institution identification code Constant set by acquirer bank 
33  forwarding institution identification code Constant set by acquirer bank, indicates the institution that will provide the card 
payment clearing (steps 6 to 9 in Figure 2) 
34  primary account number, extended  Not applicable to Visa – used only when the primary account number begins 
with “59” 
39  action code (was response code)  Constant “0xx” for financial transaction request messages 
43  card acceptor name/location  Constant string name and location of the merchant 
49  currency code, transaction  0x5F2A – Transaction currency code 
50  currency code, reconciliation  Currency code for reconciliation, see item 5 
51  currency code, cardholder billing  0x9F42 – Currency Code from the card. 
66  country code, receiving institution 0x5F28 – Country code for the bank that issued the card i.e. 0826 – UK 
100  receiving institution identification code  Code that identifies victim’s bank – ISO 7812 
102  account identification 1 Information contained in 16-digit card account number 0x5A 
103 account identification 2 Information contained in 16-digit card account number 0x5A 
In the above table, data fields from the EMV card data are denoted by their EMV reference number e.g. 0x5A. 
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Table 3 shows the communication sequence required for the POS 
emulation to transmit a transaction to the acquirer bank. 
Table 3. POS / acquirer communication sequence 
Message 
From → 
To 
Purpose 
financial presentment 
request message 
POS → 
Acquirer 
Requests approval and 
money transfer by the 
acquirer 
financial presentment 
response 
Acquirer 
→ POS 
Contains the answer to the 
request 
financial presentment 
confirmation 
POS → 
Acquirer 
Confirms that the 
response was received 
7. TEST RESULTS 
The attack software has been tested against various UK-issued 
credit / debit cards. Table 4 shows the vulnerability of several 
different card types. 
Table 4. Vulnerability of UK-issued contactless card types 
Card Type Max Value Comment 
Visa credit cards  
(UK currency) 
£85.00 
Visa credit cards will 
approve multiple 
transactions until offline 
limit reached  
Visa credit cards 
(foreign currency) 
€999,999.99 
$999,999.99 
 
Visa credit cards will 
approve foreign currency 
transactions up to the 
maximum value possible 
in EMV 
Visa debit cards 
(UK currency) 
£45.00 
Visa debit cards will 
approve multiple 
transactions until offline 
limit reached 
Visa debit cards 
(foreign currency) 
€0.00 
$0.00 
Visa debit cards decline 
foreign currency 
contactless transactions 
MasterCard N/A 
MasterCard is not 
affected by this attack as 
the cards request online 
completion of transactions 
in local currency and 
foreign currencies 
7.1 Transaction capture timings 
The Android transaction capture app is designed to operate as 
quickly as possible, thereby reducing the risk of detection for the 
attacker.  The software automatically collects the fraudulent 
transaction as soon as it detects a Visa contactless credit or debit 
card. Table 5 shows analysis of protocol timings from 20 captured 
fraudulent transactions. 
Table 5. Fraudulent transaction capture timings 
Statistics Time (in milliseconds) 
Average transaction duration (card 
discovery to transaction approval) 
478ms 
Standard deviation 36ms 
Fastest transaction 452ms 
Slowest transaction 527ms 
8. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS 
The key weakness exploited in this paper is that Visa credit cards 
will authorise unlimited value transactions in a foreign currency.  
This makes the attack described in this paper both scalable and 
very lucrative. 
The solution is relatively simple.  This can be done by changing 
future Visa credit cards to implement one or both of the 
following: 
 the cards will request online completion of contactless 
foreign currency transactions; making the transaction subject 
to the additional online verification steps. 
 the cards will force “Chip & PIN” completion of all foreign 
currency transactions; this will eliminate the possibility of 
high value transactions without the added security of 
cardholder’s PIN. 
9. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have demonstrated that it is possible to collect 
high value transactions from contactless Visa credit cards whilst 
the card is still in the victim’s pocket.  The attack exploits a 
previously undocumented flaw in the cards, in which the cards 
will approve transactions of unlimited value in a foreign currency. 
Combined with the lack of POS terminal authentication and the 
threat of contactless payment card skimming, this vulnerability 
poses a real risk that allows high value fraudulent transaction to 
be harvested and converted into money. 
Our experimental results show that the attack could be 
implemented in the “real world” because: 
 it takes less than 500milliseconds to collect a transaction 
 NFC enabled Android phones are cheap and readily available 
 the phone looks innocent if the attacker is challenged by the 
police or a member of the public 
We have also outlined a scenario by which the captured fraudulent 
transactions could be exploited by a rogue merchant to access the 
money in the victim’s bank account.  The rogue merchant receives 
the transactions and passes them off as genuine transactions to 
their bank.  It should be noted that although we have implemented 
the rogue POS terminal software, we have not tested it against a 
live acquirer transaction clearing system.  
From this we can conclude that this attack represents a plausible 
threat to contactless Visa credit cards.  We can also see that it can 
be easily remedied. 
We have proposed two simple changes in the operation of Visa 
credit cards that would eliminate the risk posed by this attack.  
Both of which use the existing functionality of the cards and 
would therefore be relatively inexpensive to implement. 
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